The Haqqani History: Bin Ladin's Advocate Inside the TalibanNew Documents – Posted on 9/11 Anniversary – Offer Partial View Inside Newly-Dubbed Terrorist Network
(courtesy of Harvard University)
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 389 Posted - September 11, 2012
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Washington, D.C., September 11, 2012 – In the wake of the
State Department's recent designation of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Haqqani
Network as a terrorist organization, declassified
documents posted today – on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks – by the
National Security Archive offer new insight into the Haqqani family's long
history with militancy. The records on Network founder Jalaluddin Haqqani
detail direct meetings between Haqqani and U.S. diplomats, [Doc 4] his role as a Taliban military
commander, [Doc 2] and intimate ties to foreign
militants, [Doc 1] al-Qaeda connections, [Doc 5] as well as his potentially critical
function as a major advocate for Osama bin Laden within the Taliban
administration. [Doc 3]
The released documents include a confession from Haqqani that he had
enjoyed very amicable relations with U.S. officials during the Soviet war in
Afghanistan, but that the friendship soured after the 1998 U.S. bombing of a
Haqqani-linked terrorist camp in Khost, Afghanistan, undertaken by President
Bill Clinton in retaliation for al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Although the U.S. decided to officially declare the Haqqani Network a
terrorist organization only on September 7, 2012, Haqqani's ties to extremism
and al-Qaeda date back to the Soviet intervention and the founding of
al-Qaeda. All major leaders in the Haqqani group had already been identified
as al-Qaeda and Taliban affiliates and sanctioned by the UN at the request of
Washington. [Doc 6]
The National Security Archive obtained the documents below through the
Freedom of Information Act. As the U.S. government declassifies and releases
more materials, the Archive will make them available, including through
future Web postings.
Documents
Document 1 - Karachi 01617: U.S. Consulate
Karachi, Cable, "The Harakat-ul-Ansar - The Pakistan Dimension
[Excised]," March 29, 1995, Secret, 14 pp.
Describing long-standing ties between Jalaluddin Haqqani and foreign
terrorists, a report by the U.S. Department of State on the Kashmiri militant
group Harakat-ul-Ansar notes "many of the activists of Harakat-ul-Ansar
are reportedly veterans of the Afghan war who fought along with Maulana
Jalaluddin Haqqani in Paktia Province. A significant portion of the
membership is non-Pakistani, made up of Afghan war veterans from Algeria,
Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, and other countries, all of whom have stayed on after
conclusion of the Afghan jihad. Three sources have told us that the
membership also includes a small number of American muslims - we've heard
numbers ranging from six to sixteen…"
Document 2 - Islamabad 00154 : U.S.
Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Afghanistan: Jalaluddin Haqqani's Emergence
As a Key Taliban Commander," January 7, 1997, Confidential, 14pp.
Taliban military commander Jalaluddin Haqqani is reported in this 1997
account to be "more liberal" in his opinions on social policy, such
as women's rights, than other Taliban officials. But he does not seem to be
in a position to influence Taliban positions on these issues. Haqqani
nevertheless remains respected as a competent and influential officer in
Taliban military affairs. His ties to "various radical Arab groups"
concern the Department of State, as one source reports that "in exchange
for weapons and money… [he is] offering shelter for various Arabs in areas of
Paktia province." The Department notes that "reporting in other
channels indicate that Haqqani maintains these links" with radical Arab
elements in Afghanistan. An additional previously published document similarly discusses Haqqani's
ties to Arab and Kashmiri militants.
Document 3 - Islamabad 04450: U.S. Embassy
(Islamabad) Cable, "Afghanistan: Taliban Said to Loosen Grip on Bin
Ladin as They Increasingly Turn to Him for Financial Support and
Advice," June 12, 1998, Confidential, 9 pp.
Sources inform U.S. officials that Jalaluddin Haqqani is an important
individual advocating for Osama bin Laden in the Taliban administration.
Washington is concerned as bin Laden appears to be operating largely free of
Taliban government control and is being protected by Taliban elements.
Sources claim bin Laden's augmented autonomy and influence are due at least
in part to "the growing strength of his supporters within the Taliban
movement... Bin Ladin is benefiting from the enhanced strength within the
movement of such men as Jalaluddin Haqqani, a well-known pro-Taliban
commander… Ideologically close to bin Ladin's internationalist Islamist
positions, these men have successfully argued with other Taliban in recent
months to reduce controls on bin Ladin."
Document 4 - State 095538: U.S. Department
of State, Cable, "Usama bin Ladin: Pressing High-Level Taliban Official
Jalaluddin Haqqani on Bin Ladin," May 24, 1999, Secret, NODIS, 6 pp.
U.S. officials meet directly with Jalaluddin Haqqani in 1999 to
discuss Osama bin Ladin. Haqqani is in the Taliban administration serving as
"Acting Minister of Borders," and is known as a "key"
official "with links to Arab militants." Despite noting that
"he was deeply appreciative of U.S. assistance during the 'jihad' (holy
war) against the Soviets and the (Afghan) communists," tensions between
Haqqani and U.S. officials are palpable since American missiles destroyed a
Haqqani-linked terrorist camp in Khost, Afghanistan, in August 1998. Haqqani
initiates the meeting by "joking" that it was "good to meet
someone from the country which had destroyed my base, my madrassh [sic], and
killed 25 of my mujahideen."
Bin Laden remains the focus of the meeting with Haqqani. American
officials tell Haqqani, "the U.S. would continue to make things
difficult for the Taliban if the [bin Laden] issue remained unresolved. It
was in the Taliban's advantage to expel him immediately." Haqqani agrees
bin Laden is "a problem," but insists that "maybe the best
solution is what is taking place now with him remaining in the country."
Document 5 - ISAF - RC East OSINT Summary:
International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan (ISAF), Report,
"The Landing Zone, RC East OSINT Summary," December 18, 2008,
Secret, 8 pp.
Quoting unclassified sources, a letter ostensibly signed by Jalaluddin
Haqqani, the head of a network "very closely aligned with Al
Qaeda," was released denouncing Taliban leader Mullah Omar as
"ineffective, ignorant, and illiterate." Most suspect the letter is
a fake. "Intelligence agents with the international forces suggest that
the letter originated from the Afghan government or its allies as an attempt
to inflame tensions between insurgent groups." The previously-classified
ISAF intelligence analyst commentary notes: "The strategy of separating
the Taliban from Al Qaida is a pretty farfetched concept since the majority
of low level fighters for these organizations are known to be used by both…
Al Qaida plays a coordinating and strategic role between several syndicate
organizations, enabling global support while simultaneously ensuring the
harmonization of these groups. These actions assist with… the Taliban's main
objective of forcing western forces out of Afghanistan and regaining control
of the national government."
In other words, attempts to separate groups like al-Qaeda, the Haqqani
Network and Taliban-affiliates are unlikely to succeed since on the ground
they use many of the same fighters, and the Taliban benefit from al-Qaeda and
Haqqani's strategic role in coordinating groups aiming to weaken U.S.
efforts.
Note: "RC East OSINT Summary" stands for Regional Command
[Afghanistan] East, Open Source Intelligence.
Document 6 - State 070339: U.S. Department
of State, Cable, "Instruction to Nominate Four Terrorist Leaders for
Listing by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee," July 6, 2010, Unclassified,
5 pp.
Document 7 - State 002648: U.S. Department
of State, Cable, "Pre-Notification for Impending U.S. Domestic
Designation and UNSCR 1267 Listing Request of Khalil Haqqani and Said Jan
+Abd Al-Salam," January 10, 2011, Secret, 7 pp.
As discussed in these two cables, prior to the September 7, 2012,
designation of the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization, the leaders
of the Haqqani group had already been added to the UN 1267 Committee list of
"individuals and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Taliban
or al Qaida." The Department notes that "[l]isted individuals are
subject to UN Security Council mandated sanctions, including a travel ban,
arms embargo, and assets freeze." Individuals who had been named include
Haqqani Network founder Jalaluddin Haqqani, his sons Badruddin (killed in
August 2012), Nasiruddin and Sirajuddin, as well as Jalaluddin's brother,
Khalil Haqqani, who was said to have "acted on behalf of al Qa'ida (AQ)
and has been linked to AQ military operations. In 2002 Khalil Haqqani
deployed men to reinforce AQ elements in Paktia Province,
Afghanistan."
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